Zero Foxtrot

Tinian, Mariana Islands

24 July 1944.

WWII U.S. V Amphibious Corps

2ND and 4TH Marine Divisions vs. Japanese Army

Tinian sat three miles from Saipan, flat, hot, and valuable. The Marine Corps wanted it, and the Japanese knew it. The obvious beaches were near Tinian Town and Sunharon Harbor. It was wider, cleaner, and exactly where Japan focused their defenses to slaughter the Americans.

But the strategy was predictable, so they put the Recon teams to work. White Beach 1 and White Beach 2 were barely beaches. One was only 60 yards long with coral, reefs, tight lanes, and almost no room for men, vehicles, or mistakes. On paper, they were terrible ideas, but that was the point.

Recon Marines and Underwater Demolition Teams went in at night and checked whether infantry and vehicles could get ashore without everybody drowning. The answer was yes, barely, if they left the swim waivers in the motor pool, but it was doable.

On July 24, 1944, about 15,600 Marines landed and the plan worked. The Japanese had built their attention around the convenient beaches. By 0800, three battalions were ashore in about 20 minutes with bulldozers and tanks shortly after.

The fight was still ugly as the Japanese counter attack hit that night. Mines, caves, heat, and close terrain still had to be paid for in blood. The Americans lost 389 killed and 1,816 wounded. More than 5,000 Japanese troops were killed. Thousands of civilians died or were interned.

By August 1, Tinian was secured. Then Seabees turned it into one of the busiest airfields of the war. B-29s launched from there against Japan, including Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Sometimes when you know you're in a fight, and you know that they know, you know what they know, you know they know. You can catch em with their kimono down.

Tech Sgt John A. Chapman
U.S. Air Force Special Tactics Combat Controller attached to a Navy SEAL team

4 March 2002 War in Afghanistan

Posthumously promoted to Master Sergeant (MSgt) after his Medal of Honor award and Hall of Heroes induction.

Takur Ghar sat around 10,000 feet, cold and occupied. During Operation Anaconda, a special operations recon team tried to insert by MH-47 Chinook onto the peak. The bird came in. The mountain answered with RPGs and machine guns.

Razor 03 was hit. Navy SEAL Neil Roberts fell from the aircraft onto an enemy-held mountaintop. The damaged helicopter limped away and made an emergency landing miles off. John Chapman, an Air Force combat controller who was attached to the SEAL team, coordinated air support and the rescue effort on their way back to recover Roberts. They knew the hill was occupied. They chose to climb back into the fight.

Chapman came off the helicopter and moved uphill through thigh-deep snow under fire from multiple directions. He charged the closest bunker, closed with the enemy, cleared it, and killed the fighters inside. Then another machine gun opened up from a second bunker only 12 meters away.

Chapman left cover again and attacked the second position where he was hit hard. The team believed he was dead and broke contact. Thats the part that get's controversial.

Years later, overhead ISR footage forced the story back open. The grainy feed showed Chapman was still alive. He regained himself, moved, fought alone, and engaged enemy positions firing on the incoming QRF aboard Razor 01. A man written off by the chaos of the moment was still buying time for men who had not even reached the ground yet.

Chapman was later killed on that mountain. His Air Force Cross was upgraded to the Medal of Honor in 2018, making him the first Airman recognized with the medal for combat actions after Vietnam and the first Special Tactics Airman to receive it.

The hill doesn’t care what we write about it. But if we’re going to talk about Takur Ghar, we owe it to Chapman to keep the story as unforgiving as the ridge itself. RIP

Lyman Lemnitzer
Operation Northwoods
March 1962, Washington D.C.

In the early 1960s, Cold War tensions were rising fast. The Bay of Pigs invasion had failed, Fidel Castro was still in power, and Cuba was becoming an increasingly important Soviet ally just ninety miles from the Florida coast. Many military leaders believed direct action against Cuba was becoming inevitable. The problem was that the American public didn't want another war. Sounds familiar, I know.
In March of 1962, senior officials within the Department of Defense produced a proposal known as Operation Northwoods. The document was reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and signed by Chairman Lyman Lemnitzer before being forwarded to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. What they proposed wasn't an invasion plan. It was a collection of ideas designed to create public support for one. Up and to include the killing of American civilians and military.
The documents discussed incidents that could be blamed on Cuba and then used to justify military action. Some proposals involved staged attacks, manufactured evidence, and orchestrated acts of sabotage. One particularly surprising recommendation that stood out was: "We could blow up a US ship in Guantanamo Bay and blame Cuba."

The part that always stands out to me is who was involved. These weren't fringe actors operating in the shadows. These were some of the most senior military leaders in the United States discussing ways public opinion might be shaped to support a war that many already believed should happen.

President Kennedy rejected Operation Northwoods and the plans were never implemented. The documents disappeared into classified archives and remained hidden from public view for decades.

There is no evidence that Operation Northwoods had anything to do with Kennedy's assassination. What is true is that twenty months after rejecting one of the most controversial military proposals in American history, Kennedy was dead, and the proposal remained hidden from the public for decades.
Guantanamo Incidents (continued)