Atty. Athan Valiente

Child abuse law

The (SC) clarified the application of lascivious conduct under 𝘙𝘦𝘱𝘶𝘣𝘭𝘪𝘤 𝘈𝘤𝘵 (𝘙𝘈) 𝘕𝘰. 7610, or 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘚𝘱𝘦𝘤𝘪𝘢𝘭 𝘗𝘳𝘰𝘵𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘰𝘧 𝘊𝘩𝘪𝘭𝘥𝘳𝘦𝘯 𝘈𝘨𝘢𝘪𝘯𝘴𝘵 𝘈𝘣𝘶𝘴𝘦, 𝘌𝘹𝘱𝘭𝘰𝘪𝘵𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘋𝘪𝘴𝘤𝘳𝘪𝘮𝘪𝘯𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘈𝘤𝘵, in relation to acts of lasciviousness under the 𝘙𝘦𝘷𝘪𝘴𝘦𝘥 𝘗𝘦𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 (𝘙𝘗𝘊).

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting, the SC 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 upheld Jeffrey L. Gramatica’s conviction for lascivious conduct under 𝘚𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 5(𝘣) 𝘰𝘧 𝘙𝘈 7610, but modified another accused’s ( # # #2660399) conviction for acts of lasciviousness under 𝘈𝘳𝘵𝘪𝘤𝘭𝘦 366 𝘰𝘧 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘙𝘗𝘊.

In these consolidated cases involving minors, AAA, BBB, and CCC, the Supreme Court laid down guidelines to ensure the proper prosecution of cases under these two distinct laws.

AAA and BBB, both addicted to shabu, engaged in sexual acts with Gramatica and another man in exchange for the drug. Gramatica was later arrested and prosecuted for violation of 𝘚𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 5(𝘣) 𝘰𝘧 𝘙𝘈 7610, which penalizes lascivious conduct committed against a child exploited in prostitution or other sexual abuse.

In the other case, CCC was victimized by her grandfather, # # #266039, who touched her private parts while she was sleeping. # # #266039 was also charged under 𝘚𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 5(𝘣) 𝘰𝘧 𝘙𝘈 7610.

In his defense, Gramatica claimed that he courted BBB and had a sexual relationship with her but did not know she was a minor because she looked mature. For his part, # # #266039 denied the charges and claimed he merely woke CCC up to ask her for help applying his eye medicine.

The Regional Trial Court found both Gramatica and # # #266039 guilty of lascivious conduct under 𝘚𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 5(𝘣) 𝘰𝘧 𝘙𝘈 7610 towards BBB and CCC, respectively. The Court of Appeals affirmed their convictions.

A minor is considered to have been subjected to other sexual abuse when they are a victim of lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of an adult. In this case, BBB was 14 and CCC was 17 at the time of the incident. Gramatica was 23, and # # #266039 was 62.

Both courts found that Gramatica took advantage of BBB’s youth and vulnerable situation, using his influence over her to make her submit to his sexual demands. Meanwhile, # # #266039, due to his age and relationship as CCC’s grandfather, was able to exert control over her and exploit her trust.

The SC affirmed Gramatica’s conviction under RA 7610, but modified # # #266039’s conviction from acts of lasciviousness under 𝘚𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 5(𝘣) 𝘰𝘧 𝘙𝘈 7610 to acts of lasciviousness under the RPC explaining that RA 7610 does not apply where the minor is entirely unaware, coerced or unconscious as the victim in that instance is not considered to have “indulged” in the sexual in*******se.

A plain and straightforward interpretation of 𝘚𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 5(𝘣) 𝘰𝘧 𝘙𝘈 7610 provides a clear definition of children subjected to other sexual abuse as those who indulge in sexual in*******se or lascivious conduct due to the coercion or influence of an adult.

The SC clarified the scope of lascivious conduct under 𝘚𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 5(𝘣) 𝘰𝘧 𝘙𝘈 7610 and distinguished it from related crimes under the RPC. To ensure uniform and consistent prosecution of cases, the Supreme Court laid down guidelines, considering also RA 11648, which raised the age of sexual consent to 16 years old.

𝙁𝙞𝙧𝙨𝙩, 𝘚𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 5(𝘣) 𝘰𝘧 𝘙𝘈 7610 applies to children who are 12 years of age (now 16 years old following the amendment under RA 11648) to below 18 who are subjected to sexual abuse.

𝙎𝙚𝙘𝙤𝙣𝙙, it covers situations where consent is present but defective. The minor may seem to “indulge” or agree, but does so not out of free will, but because of coercion or influence by an adult. Thus, engaging in sexual acts with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse is a criminal act, regardless of apparent consent.

𝙏𝙝𝙞𝙧𝙙, it does not apply when the act involves force, intimidation, fraud, deprivation of reason, unconsciousness, or grave abuse of authority. In such cases, the crime falls under acts of lasciviousness under the RPC.

𝙁𝙤𝙪𝙧𝙩𝙝, if the victim is under 12 or under 16, and the case does not fit Section 5(b), the crime is r**e or acts of lasciviousness under the RPC.

These principles, which distinguish force and intimidation on one hand, and coercion and influence on the other, and limit RA 7610 to minors who are exploited in prostitution or sexual abuse, also apply to other sexual crimes, including r**e.

In this case, BBB was a child exploited in prostitution or other sexual abuse because she had sexual in*******se with Gramatica in exchange for some consideration, namely shabu, which makes him criminally liable under Section 5(b).

Meanwhile, 𝘚𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 5(𝘣) 𝘰𝘧 𝘙𝘈 7610 does not apply to # # #266039.

The Supreme Court clarified that not all acts of lasciviousness against minors aged 12 to under 18 are covered by RA 7610. The law applies only when minors are subjected to sexual abuse, such as when they “indulge” or give defective consent to the conduct.

Here, CCC did not indulge in lascivious conduct, as she was asleep and unconscious during the incident. # # #266039 did not use coercion or influence, but relied on his moral ascendancy as her grandfather, which counts as intimidation. These circumstances make # # #266039 liable for acts of lasciviousness under 𝘈𝘳𝘵𝘪𝘤𝘭𝘦 336 𝘰𝘧 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘙𝘗𝘊, rather than RA 7610.

For lascivious conduct under Section 5(b) involving BBB, Gramatica was sentenced to a maximum of 17 years, four months, and one day in prison and ordered to pay BBB PHP 150,000 in civil indemnity and damages, as well as a PHP 15,000 fine.

For acts of lasciviousness under 𝘈𝘳𝘵𝘪𝘤𝘭𝘦 336 𝘰𝘧 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘙𝘗𝘊, # # #266039 was sentenced to a maximum of six years in prison and ordered to pay CCC PHP450,000 in civil indemnity and damages with interest.

The SC acknowledged that under current laws, # # #266039, “who committed abhorrent and be***al acts against his minor granddaughter,” faces a penalty lower than that under RA 7610, and called on the legislature to amend existing laws to better protect children.

The SC calls the legislature to review and amend current laws protecting children, thus:

“𝘐𝘯 𝘭𝘪𝘯𝘦 𝘸𝘪𝘵𝘩 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘢𝘣𝘰𝘷𝘦, 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘪𝘯 𝘧𝘶𝘭𝘧𝘪𝘭𝘭𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵 𝘰𝘧 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘊𝘰𝘶𝘳𝘵’𝘴 𝘥𝘶𝘵𝘺 𝘵𝘰 𝘶𝘱𝘩𝘰𝘭𝘥 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘊𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘵𝘪𝘵𝘶𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯, 𝘸𝘩𝘪𝘤𝘩 𝘮𝘢𝘯𝘥𝘢𝘵𝘦𝘴 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘴𝘱𝘦𝘤𝘪𝘢𝘭 𝘱𝘳𝘰𝘵𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘰𝘧 𝘤𝘩𝘪𝘭𝘥𝘳𝘦𝘯 𝘧𝘳𝘰𝘮 𝘢𝘭𝘭 𝘧𝘰𝘳𝘮𝘴 𝘰𝘧 𝘯𝘦𝘨𝘭𝘦𝘤𝘵, 𝘢𝘣𝘶𝘴𝘦, 𝘤𝘳𝘶𝘦𝘭𝘵𝘺, 𝘦𝘹𝘱𝘭𝘰𝘪𝘵𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘰𝘵𝘩𝘦𝘳 𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘥𝘪𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘴 𝘱𝘳𝘦𝘫𝘶𝘥𝘪𝘤𝘪𝘢𝘭 𝘵𝘰 𝘵𝘩𝘦𝘪𝘳 𝘥𝘦𝘷𝘦𝘭𝘰𝘱𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵, 𝘭𝘦𝘵 𝘵𝘩𝘪𝘴 𝘴𝘦𝘳𝘷𝘦 𝘢𝘴 𝘢 𝘤𝘢𝘭𝘭 𝘵𝘰 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘭𝘦𝘨𝘪𝘴𝘭𝘢𝘵𝘶𝘳𝘦 𝘵𝘰 𝘧𝘶𝘭𝘧𝘪𝘭𝘭 𝘪𝘵𝘴 𝘣𝘰𝘶𝘯𝘥𝘦𝘯 𝘥𝘶𝘵𝘺 𝘰𝘧 𝘳𝘦𝘷𝘪𝘦𝘸𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘢𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘥𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘰𝘶𝘳 𝘱𝘳𝘦𝘴𝘦𝘯𝘵 𝘭𝘢𝘸𝘴 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘦𝘯𝘴𝘶𝘳𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘴𝘢𝘧𝘦𝘵𝘺, 𝘸𝘦𝘭𝘭-𝘣𝘦𝘪𝘯𝘨, 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘥𝘪𝘨𝘯𝘪𝘵𝘺 𝘰𝘧 𝘰𝘶𝘳 𝘍𝘪𝘭𝘪𝘱𝘪𝘯𝘰 𝘤𝘩𝘪𝘭𝘥𝘳𝘦𝘯.”

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=162863

Read the full text of the Decision https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=162842

Read the Separate Concurring Opinion of Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/260233-266039-separate-concurring-opinion-senior-associate-justice-marvic-m-v-f-leonen/

Read the Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/260233-266039-concurring-opinion-associate-justice-alfredo-benjamin-s-caguioa/

Read the Separate Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/260233-266039-separate-concurring-opinion-associate-justice-rodil-v-zalameda/

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution

Bladed instruments

The (SC) has reiterated that the prohibition on carrying deadly weapons during elections applies to fi****ms and similar regulated weapons, but not to bladed instruments like knives, unless they are carried inside the polling place and within a radius of one hundred meters from it, during election day.

In a Resolution written by Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting, the SC’s Third Division granted the motion for reconsideration (MR) of its earlier ruling that found a man guilty of violating Section 261(p) of 𝘉𝘢𝘵𝘢𝘴 𝘗𝘢𝘮𝘣𝘢𝘯𝘴𝘢 𝘉𝘭𝘨. 881, or the 𝘖𝘮𝘯𝘪𝘣𝘶𝘴 𝘌𝘭𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 (𝘖𝘌𝘊), as amended by Section 32 of 𝘙𝘦𝘱𝘶𝘣𝘭𝘪𝘤 𝘈𝘤𝘵 𝘕𝘰. (𝘙𝘈) 7166. The SC held that while the man was found carrying a knife during the election period, there was no proof that he was in a polling place or within 100 meters of one during the days and hours prohibited under the 𝘖𝘌𝘊.

The man was arrested during the 2018 elections after authorities found him carrying a kitchen knife outside his residence without written authorization from the Commission on Elections.

Both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals found him guilty of carrying a deadly weapon during the election period.

The SC initially affirmed the lower courts’ decisions.

However, upon MR, the SC acquitted the man after finding that the prosecution failed to establish all the essential elements of the offense.

The SC clarified the scope of the weapon ban during elections. In 𝘉𝘶𝘦𝘭𝘭𝘢 𝘷. 𝘗𝘦𝘰𝘱𝘭𝘦, it held that bladed instruments are not covered by Section 261(q) of the 𝘖𝘌𝘊 and Section 32 of 𝘙𝘈 7166, which prohibit the carrying of fi****ms outside one’s residence or place of business during the election period.

However, carrying of deadly weapons in general, including knives, is still punished but under a different provision of the 𝘖𝘌𝘊—Section 261(p)—but only if done in a polling place or near it, and during specific election-related activities.

Unlike Section 261(q) of the 𝘖𝘌𝘊 which prohibits carrying of 𝐟𝐢𝐫𝐞𝐚𝐫𝐦𝐬 everywhere in public during election period, Section 261 (p) of the 𝘖𝘌𝘊 prohibits possession of 𝐝𝐞𝐚𝐝𝐥𝐲 𝐰𝐞𝐚𝐩𝐨𝐧𝐬 in general (including bladed instruments such as knives) only in or near polling places under the law.

In this case, while the prosecution established that the man was carrying a knife during the election period, it failed to prove that the act was committed in a polling place or within 100 meters of one, and that it occurred during the days and hours specifically covered by Section 261(p). In the absence of proof that he was in or near a polling place during the specified days under the law, the man’s guilt was not established.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=163156

Read the full text of the Decision https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=163149

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution