Benevolent Practice

"Even where a tenancy has come to an end a landlord is not entitled to go into the premises and physically throw out the tenant..."
ONIGBO vs. ABUBAKAR & ORS.(2018)LPELR-46473(CA)




ISSUE: NOTICE TO QUIT: Effect of failure to give a tenant adequate statutory notice






PRINCIPLE:
"Exhibit P2 is a one month notice to quit the rented building issued to the Appellant by the Respondents. It is dated 30/04/2013. The Respondents having accepted the money for the period January 2013 to December 2013, they are duty bound to allow the Appellant to use the property for that period. Even if the Respondents intend to recover the property the Appellant is entitled to be served with six months' notice on the expiration of his tenancy and I so hold. In ELIOCHIN NIG. LTD. & ORS. V. MBADIWE (1986) LPELR 1119-SC the Apex Court held that:- "Even where a tenancy has come to an end a landlord is not entitled to go into the premises and physically throw out the tenant; but must give the statutory notices to the person in possession." Based on the above therefore, Exhibit P2 (the one month notice to quit) served on the Appellant is of no moment and amounts to the breach of the contract by the Respondents."Per BAYERO, JCA.(Pp.42-43,Paras.B-A).

JULIUS BERGER (NIG.) PLC vs. INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE & ORS.(2018)LPELR-46127(CA)




ISSUE: ENFORCEMENT OF FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHT(S): Whether an action founded on Fundamental Rights Enforcement Procedure Rules is subject to the other rules of Court




PRINCIPLE:
"The suit, the subject matter of this appeal was commenced under the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement procedure)
Rules. It is my view that that procedure being SUI GENESIS, is does not admit of the importation of any other procedure
of Court, inclusive of Section 97 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act.
The case of DR. CHRIS NGIGE & ANOR. v. HON. NELSON ACHUKWU & ANOR. (2005) 2 NWLR (PT. 909) 123 relied on by
the Appellant, has one issue that the Court had to determine which was whether the High Court of Enugu State, sitting
at Enugu had the territorial and substantive jurisdiction to make the order which it made directing the Inspector General
of Police to remove the 1st Respondent office as Governor of Anambra State. The Court observed that the 30 days
required for the Defendant to answer the process before the Court in Section 99 of the Sheriff and Civil process Act will
not apply to cases of Enforcement of Fundamental Rights which must be heard within 14 days from the grant of leave to
hear such an application as founded for in the Rules made by the Chief Justice of Nigeria.
The authorities cited by the Appellant have nothing to do with the enforcement of Fundamental Rights Procedure.
Interestingly, the Appellant conceded at page 19 of his amended brief of argument that by Order 11 Rule 2 of the
Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rule 2009, a Fundamental Rights application can be commenced without
the leave of Court. I agree with him entirely. I must re-emphasize that the procedure which obtains regarding
Fundamental Rights is peculiar in its scope and does not admit the importation of any other Rules of Court. The reason
is simple. Issues of Fundamental Rights and its infringement are sensitive and dire. It borders on the dignity of the
person and protection of its rights as a human being. They are matters that need to be tackled by the Courts
expeditiously and must not be subject to the whims and caprices of technicality." Per PEMU, JCA.(Pp.27-29,Paras.C-A).






ISSUE: PAYMENT OF FILING/LEGAL/COURT FEES: Effect of failure to pay filing/legal fees




PRINCIPLE:
"From the Records, by notice in a motion filed on the 12th of November 2012, The Appellant/1st Cross-Respondent JULIUS BERGER filed (pursuant to Order IX Rule 1; Order XI of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 2009 and under the inherent jurisdiction of the Court) for an Order extending time within which it may file her counter affidavit, written address and other processes in reaction to the 2nd set of Respondent/­Cross-Appellant's affidavit in support of the motion. Ex facie, the application's assessment shows that no penalty was paid-pages 257-258 of the Record of Appeal.
On the 27th of November 2012, the Appellant/1st Cross-Respondent filed a counter affidavit and written address-pages 268-296 of the Record of Appeal.
It is true that these processes did not reflect any penalty paid for late filing. I wonder why the Cross-Appellant did not raise this issue at the Court below. The Court should have directed that the penalty be paid promptly. Howbeit, the issue is whether this lacunae vitiates the proceedings at the Court below. I am of the view that failure to pay penalty for late filing of processes by the Appellant/1st Cross-Respondent at the Court below is not one that will vitiate the Court proceedings. This is because a particular process (which can be cured of its irregularity by simply ordering the erring party to pay the necessary penalty) is not incompetent." Per PEMU, JCA.(Pp.35-37,Paras.F-A).