Rup Narayan Subedi

Iran is once again approaching a familiar inflection point. In 1979, the Pahlavi monarchy collapsed under the weight of perceived authoritarianism, inequality, and foreign alignment. It was replaced by an Islamic Republic structured around clerical supremacy and fortified by institutions such as the IRGC. That revolution was not merely a transfer of power; it was a transfer of narrative. Sovereignty replaced monarchy. Religious legitimacy replaced dynastic continuity.

Four decades later, public frustration has resurfaced. Economic contraction, inflationary pressure, currency instability, social restrictions, and constrained expression have eroded the emotional contract between state and citizen. In response, a portion of the population now turns backward, imagining that restoration of the Pahlavi name might correct systemic failure. The monarchy reappears less as a policy program and more as a psychological refuge a symbol of order projected onto memory.

This instinct reveals a deeper cognitive pattern. Societies under strain gravitate toward substitution rather than structural reform. They personalize decline. If hardship is attributed to the ruler, then replacing the ruler appears sufficient. Yet political development literature consistently demonstrates the opposite: outcomes are determined less by personality than by institutional architecture. Prosperity is a function of incentives, transparency, rule of law, and administrative competence not dynastic lineage or revolutionary rhetoric.

If post-1979 governance had delivered sustained growth, predictable regulation, credible anti-corruption enforcement, and protected civil space, regime fatigue would be marginal. Political systems endure when performance legitimizes authority. They destabilize when lived experience contradicts official narratives. When dissent is reframed as betrayal, when economic critique is securitized, and when citizens lack safe channels for expression, frustration internalizes before it erupts.

But regime change alone is not reform. Replacing clerical supremacy with dynastic symbolism, without recalibrating institutional design, risks perpetuating the same cycle under a different banner. Concentrated power remains concentrated. Weak judicial independence remains weak. Rent-seeking persists. Public trust remains conditional.

Comparative examples reinforce this point. Singapore’s transformation was not a triumph of personality alone. It institutionalized meritocratic recruitment, disciplined fiscal management, uncompromising anti-corruption enforcement, and predictable legal frameworks. Leadership translated vision into durable systems. The result was continuity beyond individuals.

Iran’s predicament is therefore structural, not symbolic. The question is not whether turbans or crowns govern. It is whether courts are insulated from political influence, whether budgets are transparent, whether regulators operate independently, whether economic policy is evidence-based rather than ideological, and whether citizens can criticize without criminalization.

Psychologically, moments of crisis intensify demand for certainty. Charismatic alternatives promise immediate restoration of dignity, stability, prosperity. These appeals satisfy emotional urgency but rarely address institutional fragility. Structural reform is incremental, technocratic, and politically less theatrical. Yet it is the only durable path.

For societies observing Iran’s oscillation between revolutionary legitimacy and monarchical nostalgia, the lesson is stark: focus on policy architecture before personality. Identity politics can mobilize, but it cannot generate sustained productivity. Judicial independence, accountable governance, transparent procurement, and protected speech create resilience against both authoritarianism and populism.

Leadership is transient. Institutions persist. A country that depends on exceptional rulers remains vulnerable to flawed ones. A country that embeds accountability within its system mitigates both extremes.

Iran’s future will not be secured by romanticizing its past nor by sacralizing its revolution. It will be secured by redesigning its institutional incentives aligning power with accountability, authority with transparency, and policy with economic rationality.

Anything less is merely a rotation of faces within an unchanged structure.

Bhutan should introduce a legal restriction preventing children under 16 from holding social media accounts. This is not a moral argument; it is a developmental and public-health argument. Adolescence is a critical period for emotional regulation, identity formation, sleep stability, and cognitive focus. Major health authorities have warned that heavy social media use is associated with anxiety, depression, body-image concerns, disrupted sleep, and exposure to cyberbullying and harmful content. The U.S. Surgeon General’s 2023 advisory concluded that evidence is strong enough to justify precautionary action, especially for younger teens. Likewise, the American Psychological Association has emphasised that adolescents are uniquely vulnerable to social comparison and algorithm-driven engagement systems.

An under-16 restriction establishes a boundary during the most sensitive developmental window. It delays exposure to addictive design features—algorithmic feeds, infinite scroll, and notification loops—that are engineered for engagement rather than wellbeing. Countries such as Australia have already moved from voluntary guidance to enforceable age-based obligations on platforms. The policy shift internationally reflects recognition that self-regulation by large technology companies has not adequately protected minors.

For Bhutan, the approach should be structured, lawful, and proportionate. The objective is not censorship and not suppression of expression. The Constitution of Bhutan guarantees freedom of speech and expression under Article 7(2), subject to reasonable restrictions in the interests of sovereignty, security, unity, and public order. Any under-16 restriction must therefore be narrowly tailored to child protection, clearly defined in law, and subject to procedural safeguards and review. It must not interfere with lawful adult expression or political discourse.

Bhutan already possesses a workable enforcement foundation through its telecommunications and information-communications regulatory framework. Under the Bhutan Telecommunications Act 1999, licence conditions for telecom operators can be modified and regulatory directions can be issued. This gives Bhutan the legal capacity to require licensed service providers to cooperate with child-protection measures when platforms are non-compliant. The Bhutan Information, Communications and Media Act 2006 further establishes regulatory oversight over communications services and can be amended to introduce explicit age-based duties for online platforms operating within Bhutan.

Rather than adopting confrontational or blanket blocking measures, Bhutan can adopt a compliance-based model. Any social media company offering services to users in Bhutan should be legally required to implement effective age-assurance mechanisms and appoint a compliance contact for Bhutan. Since most major platforms maintain significant operational offices in India, Bhutan can establish a formal compliance channel through those regional offices. A designated Bhutanese regulatory officer or liaison authority could engage directly with the India-based corporate offices of Meta, Google, ByteDance, and others. This officer’s mandate would be limited to child-protection compliance- age verification standards, reporting processes, transparency metrics; without demanding access to private communications or violating constitutional rights.

Such an arrangement would reflect practical diplomacy for a small state: instead of demanding local incorporation immediately, Bhutan would leverage existing regional corporate structures. This way we can also prevent nepal like situation that resulted from social media ban. Non-compliance would trigger graduated responses- warnings, administrative penalties, and, only if necessary and proportionate, targeted technical restrictions through licensed telecom operators. This preserves regulatory credibility without destabilising communication infrastructure.

Schools should complement the legal reform by reducing non-essential social media exposure during school hours and strengthening digital literacy education. Research consistently shows that sleep disruption and constant online comparison undermine concentration and academic performance. School-based norms that limit phone and social media access during instructional time support cognitive development and social interaction without restricting broader educational use of digital tools.

The policy goal is balance. Bhutan must protect children’s wellbeing while respecting constitutional freedoms for adults. An under-16 restriction does not criminalise youth; it sets a developmental safeguard. Adults retain full expression rights. Teenagers over 16 retain access under law. Enforcement operates through transparent legal mechanisms, not arbitrary shutdowns.

Bhutan has long prioritised Gross National Happiness as a development philosophy. Protecting children from premature immersion in high-intensity algorithmic social environments aligns with that philosophy. A carefully drafted under-16 social media restriction grounded in constitutional principles, implemented through telecom regulation, coordinated with regional platform offices in India, and supported by school policy would be a measured, lawful step toward safeguarding the next generation’s mental and social wellbeing.

Prime Minister's Office - PMO, Bhutan
Sherig Bhutan
Tshering Tobgay
The Bhutanese
Tenzing Lamsang
Kuensel

Why So Many Bhutanese Are Leaving for Australia. And What It Says About Us?.

Across Bhutan today, departure is no longer unusual. It is normal. At Paro airport, farewells have become routine. Families sell land, borrow money, and pool savings so that one child can board a flight to Australia. Not for adventure, but for opportunity.

The numbers are no longer small enough to ignore. Thousands of Bhutanese have moved to Australia in recent years, many of them young, educated, and professionally trained. Teachers, nurses, civil servants, university graduates, the very people the country invested in are leaving. For a nation of roughly 750,000 people, even a few thousand departures each year carry serious consequences.

Why are they going?

The reasons are not mysterious. Wages in Bhutan remain low relative to the cost of living and vastly lower than in Australia. Career progression in the civil service is slow. The private sector is underdeveloped and struggles to create enough skilled jobs. Many graduates simply cannot find work that matches their education. Ambition outpaces opportunity.

Australia, on the other hand, offers clear pathways: study visas, graduate work visas, higher pay, and the possibility of permanent residence. A young Bhutanese graduate can earn in months what might take years at home. For families who have invested heavily in education, the decision becomes practical, not emotional.

But this is where the uncomfortable questions begin.

Bhutan has long spoken about sustainable development and Gross National Happiness. Yet many young Bhutanese quietly ask: happiness for whom? If educated youth do not see economic dignity at home, slogans lose power. When nearly half of resignations in certain public sectors come from education and health professionals, it signals something deeper than wanderlust. It signals structural dissatisfaction.

This migration wave did not happen overnight. It reflects long-standing policy choices: heavy dependence on public employment, limited economic diversification, cautious private sector reforms, and slow adaptation to a globalised labour market. For years, the warning signs were visible, graduate unemployment, stagnant wages, rising frustration but responses were incremental rather than transformative.

The cost of this outflow is not only economic. It is social. Rural communities grow quieter. Schools struggle to retain teachers. Hospitals lose experienced staff. Parents age without children nearby. A small country feels even smaller.

Globally, brain drain is not unique to Bhutan. Many developing countries lose talent to wealthier nations. But successful countries respond strategically. They build competitive domestic industries. They create innovation ecosystems. They offer incentives for return. They treat their diaspora not as loss, but as a national asset.

Bhutan has yet to do this at scale.

If policymakers want talent to return or to stay, the message must be concrete, not rhetorical. Young professionals need meaningful jobs, competitive wages, entrepreneurial support, transparent governance, and faster career mobility. They need to believe that ambition is possible at home.

The migration to Australia is not betrayal. It is a rational choice made by individuals responding to economic reality. The real question is whether Bhutan will adjust its policies to match that reality.

A nation cannot rely forever on loyalty alone. If opportunity does not grow at home, departures will continue quietly, steadily until the cost becomes irreversible.